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Abstract
East Natuna gas field, which has proven reserves of 46 trillion cubic feet, is projected to meet long-term natural gas
needs. However, CO2-content of the gas reserves reaches 71%, leading to expensive development costs. This research
investigates the feasibility of the field based on several fiscal incentives. Firstly, gas supply-demand until year 2040 was
analyzed. Then, based on the analysis, the field was developed using high CO2 gas separation technology to produce gas
of 1300 MMSCFD in 2023, 2600 MMSCFD in 2031, and 3900 MMSCFD in 2039. Finally, the economic feasibility
was assessed using cash flow analysis in accordance with Indonesia’s production sharing contract scheme. The results
show that the supply-demand gap continues to increase and thus the development is urgently needed. The development
cost is estimated around US$ 27.59 billion. The gas selling prices are assumed at US$ 8/MMBTU for wellhead, US$
11/MMBTU for pipelines, and US$ 11/MMBTU for LNG. To achieve minimum IRR value of 12%, the government
needs to offer incentives of 30-year contract period, profit sharing of 55%: 45%, first tranche petroleum to 10%, and tax
holiday of 10 years. Toll fee for Natuna-Cirebon pipeline is US$ 2.3/MMBTU at IRR of 12.6%.

Abstrak
Penerapan Insentif Fiskal dalam Pengembangan Lapangan Gas Natuna Timur Guna Memenuhi Kebutuhan
Jangka Panjang Gas Bumi Nasional. Lapangan gas Natuna Timur yang mempunyai cadangan terbukti 46 TCF
diproyeksikan untuk memenuhi kebutuhan jangka panjang gas nasional. Karena cadangan gas mengandung hingga 71%
CO2, maka dibutuhkan biaya pengembangan yang tinggi. Penelitian ini mempelajari kelayakan ekonomi lapangan
melalui penerapan beberapa insentif fiskal. Pertama, pasokan kebutuhan gas hingga tahun 2040 dianalisis. Kemudian,
berdasarkan hasil analisis tersebut, lapangan gas dikembangkan dengan teknologi pemisahan CO2 berkadar tinggi guna
memproduksi gas sebesar 1300 MMSCFD di tahun 2023, 2600 MMSCFD di tahun 2031, dan 3900 MMSCFD di tahun
2039. Kelayakan ekonomi proyek kemudian dievaluasi menggunakan analisis aliran uang (cash flow) berdasarkan pola
kontrak bagi hasil versi Indonesia. Hasil yang diperoleh menunjukkan gap pasokan kebutuhan gas terus meningkat, dan
karenanya pengembangan lapangan sangat mendesak dilakukan. Pada harga gas di wellhead US$ 8/MMBTU dan US$
11/MMBTU untuk gas pipa/LNG, agar proyek layak dikembangkan dengan IRR minimum 12%, maka pemerintah
harus memberikan insentif berupa periode kontrak selama 30 tahun, pola bagi hasil 55% : 45%, first tranche petroleum
10%, dan tax holiday 10 tahun. Adapun toll fee untuk pipa Natuna-Cirebon pada IRR 12,6% adalah US$ 2,3/MMBTU.
Keywords: East Natuna gas field, natural gas, CO2 separation and storage, gas supply and demand, feasibility analysis

1. Introduction

One of the fields with huge reserves of gas is the East
Natuna Block, Riau Islands. A number of studies have
been conducted to develop East Natuna, including a
study by Exxon-Mobil, based on exploration license in
1980-2006 [1]. Currently, the government has appointed
Pertamina together with Exxon-Mobil, Total SA, and
Thailand’s PTTEP to develop East Natuna.

The use of natural gas to meet energy demand continues
to increase, mainly due to economic growth and the
increasing demand for environment-friendly energy. As
a country with large gas reserves, Indonesia is able to
meet such an increase from a number of gas fields
across the archipelago.
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Gas consumers consist of households, industries,
electricity, transportation, and commercial sectors
across Indonesia, with the largest concentration in Java.
However, the majority of gas sources are located
outside Java, making the lack of infrastructures becomes
an obstacle. Therefore, the utilization of East Natuna
gas should by supported by the development of gas
pipelines from East Natuna to Java Island, namely
Natuna-Cirebon gas pipeline.
The average growth of worldwide gas demand reaches
1.6% per year, i.e. from 3.4 trillion cubic meters (TCM)
in 2013 to 5 TCM in 2035 [2]. The biggest growth
occurs in China (6.6%) and Asia (4.4%). This growth
has the potential to be fulfilled by East Natuna gas field,
particularly for Japan, Korea and China, as well as
Singapore and Thailand, both by pipelines and LNG.
The East Natuna block is situated 1340 km from Jakarta
at a depth of 60-150 meters. This field has gas reserves
of 222 trillion cubic feet (TCF), consisting of CO2 (up
to 71%), hydrocarbons, especially methane (28%), H2S
(0.5%) and N2 (0.4%). The gas reserves can generate
approximately 46 TCF [1]. The challenge that the
development of the field confronts is to separate and
inject CO2 into the aquifer [3]. This study employed a
cryogenic technique of CO2 separation called
Controlled Freeze Zone (CFZ) developed by
ExxonMobil [4].
This paper aims to examine the projected demand and
supply of gas until 2040 and the roles of East Natuna in
fulfilling the demand. In addition, field development
feasibility analysis using LNG and gas pipeline
technologies within the high level and costly CO2
constraint was performed. This was done through 2
development scenarios with variety of fiscal incentives
in accordance with the applicable PSC scheme.

2. Methods
This research consists of two main parts. First is to find
the projected gas demand until 2040 based on the
econometric calculation of gas demand elasticity in
accordance with historical data. The projected gas
supply was calculated based on the gas balance
provided by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral
Resources (KESDM) and the Agency for the
Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT)
[5,6]. Then, the gas demand and supply were analyzed
to find the gap of national gas. Based on the gap, the
East Natuna field development scenario was prepared
for 2023 to 2052.
Second, the techno-economic feasibility analysis of the
project was provided based on LNG and pipeline
technologies, using the cash flow method on the PSC
Makara J. Technol.

scheme. Because of the high cost of CO2 treatments,
various PSC incentives were analyzed to provide a
feasible field development based on to the following:
(a) Scenario 1: Feasibility analysis of field development
using LNG plant and Natuna-Cirebon gas pipeline in
accordance with the upstream contract scheme;
(b) Scenario 2: Feasibility analysis of field development
using LNG plant based on upstream scheme, and the
Natuna-Cirebon pipeline in accordance with the
downstream scheme.
Gas demand. The magnitude of gas demand depends
on the GDP growth and the elasticity of gas demand [7].
Projected national gas demand until 2040 was
calculated using the elasticity of gas demand of
industrial sectors, households, electricity, and transport
to the growth of national GDP.
The equation used to calculate the projected gas demand
by sector was:

E Dn = E Dn −1 + ( E Dn −1 × e × GDPgrowth )
Where:
EDn

(1)

: Demand for gas year n (in energy unit)

EDn −1 : Demand for gas year n-1 (in energy unit)
GDPgrowth : GDP growth (%)

e

: Elasticity

Elasticity of each sector was calculated based on the
average historical data in 1991-2010 issued by KESDM
[8]. The elasticities in 2011-2012 for industrial sectors,
households, transport, and electricity were 1.00, 4.00,
0.50, and 1.03 respectively. While the projected
elasticities in 2013-2040 for industrial sectors,
households, transport, and electricity were 1.00, 0.25,
0.50 and 1.03 respectively.
Meanwhile, the projected GDP growth until 2040 was
obtained from the MP3EI [9]. Furthermore, the
calculation of gas demand per sector was performed
using INOSYD model developed by Faculty of
Engineering, University of Indonesia.
Gas demand for exports to countries like China, Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand were also
projected to grow, approximately 1.5% per year [2]. Thus,
the East Natuna field has the potential to meet this export
requirements, with the allocation of approximately 20% of
the total production volume.
Gas supply. Gas supply was obtained from the Gas
Balance issued by KESDM in the forms of LNG, CBM
and gas pipelines, based on: a) existing supplies,
actively-producing gas fields; b) project supplies, fields
August 2015 | Vol. 19 | No. 2
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that are being developed; c) and potential supplies, oil
and gas fields that are being explored [10].
The national LNG supplies were provided by Arun,
Badak, and Tangguh fields, as well as fields that are
now being developed, namely Donggi-Senoro and
Masela. Approximately 80% of the national gas
production was in the form of LNG with a production
capacity as shown in Table 1. The projected supplies of
gas that can be produced by the entire LNG plants grow
approximately 2% per year on average.
CBM supplies have been initiated in 2013 by producing
of 0.5 MMSCFD from South Sumatra. In accordance
with the plan by the KESDM, the projected production
of CBM will reach 500 MMSCFD in 2015, 1,000
MMSCFD in 2020, and 1,500 MMSCFD in 2025 [10].
Gas pipelines were supplied from fields that spread all
over Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Riau Islands, and
South Sulawesi with a growth of 4% per year. Export
natural gas pipeline came from Grissik and West
Natuna. The entire gas supplies were then compiled and
calculated as a source of gas supplies to consumers.
The largest consumers of national gas can be found in
the western part of Java, East Java, Central Java, North
Sumatra, and South Sumatra. The western part of Java
and East Java absorb about 2/3 and ¼ of the national gas
supplies respectively. In the future, though consumption
will spread, Java will still consume about 70% of the
national gas supplies [11].
To meet national gas demand, it was assumed that the
Master Plan for the National Natural Gas Transmission
and Distribution Network (the Decree of Ministry of
KESDM No.2700K/11/2012 EMR) in the form of gas
pipelines, LNG plant and LNG receiving terminals
Table 1. LNG Plants in Indonesia

Field
Arun

Masela

Estimated development costs. The estimated cost of the
development of East Natuna field was calculated based on
the cost components of the following capital and noncapital works: 1). Field acquisition, permitting, signatory
bonuses, and land use rights based on the SKK Migas
Decrees with a total cost of US$ 85 millions [13]; 2). Field
exploration that consisted of drilling, well logging,
geological and geophysical analysis, 3D seismic,
processing and analysis of data with a total cost of US$
1.368 billions [14]; 3). Development of 26 wells with a
production capacity of 1300 MMSCFD and a flow rate of
350 MMSCFD per well, using a 9-5/8 inch pipe, with a
total cost of US$ 2.392 billions [15]. 4). Development of
CO2 Injection
Well

CO2 Injection
Platform

Wellhead tree Assembly, flying lead,
Tree Mounted Control.
Pout ,CPF = 30MPa

Pin ,CO2 injection platform = 18MPa

10” ~ 10 km
Flowline

The number of wells
& flowline = 26

Riser ~ 8,625 ft

20” - 35 km
Pout ,CPF = 30MPa

Central
Processing
Facilities

Onshore LNG Plant @ Natuna
Island

Pin ,CPF = 7MPa

42” – Pipeline to Java (1400 km)

Riser ~ 8,625 ft
Flowline
10” ~ 10 km

Umbilical ~10 km

Donggi-Senoro

Train 1,2,3
Train 4,5
Train 6
Train A & B
Train C & D
14 & 26
Train E & F
Train G & H
Train 1
Train 2
17
Train 3
Train 4
3
Train 1
Train 1
18
Train 2
19,7

Capacity
(MTPA)
5.1
4.4
2.5
6.4
4.6
5.0
6.2
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
2
2.5
2.5

Gas production scenarios. The East Natuna field was
put into scenarios that produced gas in three phases,
namely 1300 MMSCFD in 2023, 2600 MMSCFD in
2031, and 3900 MMSCFD in 2039. In the first phase,
800 MMSCFD cleaned gas was allocated to pipeline
and 500 MMSCFD to LNG plant. In the second phase,
1600 MMSCFD of cleaned gas wasfor pipeline and
1000 MMSCFD to LNG plant. In the last stage, 2900
MMSCFDof cleaned gas was assigned for pipeline and
1000 MMSCFD for LNG plant (see Figure 2).

... ... ...

Tangguh

Plant

Field development strategy. Strategy for the
development of East Natuna gas field is shown in
Figure 1. The development works included the
constructions of offshore gas fields and the processing
of acid gas that includes the separation of a high content
of CO2 using CFZ technology carried out in offshore
Central Processing Facilities (CPF). Furthermore,
hydrocarbons, especially the separated methane, would
be channeled into a piping system and LNG plants in
Natuna Island.

Umbilical ~10 km

Badak &
Mahakam

Reserve
(TCF)

proceeded according to the plan. The completion of
these facilities is a prerequisite for the development of
the East Natuna field, including the construction of the
Natuna-Cirebon pipeline and the LNG plant. East
Natuna also needs to be connected to the Trans ASEAN
Gas Pipe, TAGP [12].

The Functions of Central Processing Facilities:
Performing the process of gas sweetening (dehidrating, acid
gas removal)
Channelling CO2 that has been separated to CO2 injection
platform to be reinjacted to aquifer.
The number of CPF necessary for 2 units is 13 each

Figure 1. East Natuna Field Development Strategy
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petroleum (FTP), and taxes. Based on the targeted gas
selling price as indicated above, the feasibility of the
project was initially calculated under ‘basic conditions’
(base case), with an incentive of the contract period of
30 years, which according to the regulation, it should be
only 20 years. The summary of assumption used on the
PSC regime is shown in Table 3.
Furthermore, since the economic analysis of the project
under the base case condition was found not feasible,
then in order to obtain a minimum IRR of 12% and a
Figure 2. Scenarios for Gas Production of East Natuna
Field

subsea facilities that consists of subsea trees assembly,
umbilicals, flowlines, risers, control equipment and pipes,
with a total cost of US$ 2.102 billions [16]. 5).
Development of Central Processing Platform (CPF) based
on the field cost of Platong II with a capacity of 330
MMSCFD and a total cost of US$ 3.1 billions [17]. Using
the DOE cost scaling method, the estimated cost of 2
Natuna’s CPF is US$ 7.807 billions; 6). Development of
CO2 separation facilities based on ExxonMobil’s CFZ
project in LaBarge, US, and facilities for CO2 injection
into the aquifer, with a total cost of US$ 11.281 billions
[18]; 7). Construction of onshore infrastructure on
Natuna Island to support development activities,
including marine transportation, communication and
accommodation, with a cost of US$ 500 millions [15];
8). The development of LNG plant on Natuna Island,
along with the 200-km gas pipeline, with a capacity of
3.8 MTPA, according to a study by Songhurst reaches
US$ 2.763 billions [19]; 9). Construction of 2 x 42 inch
Natuna-Cirebon gas pipelines, 1400 km length and a
capacity of 3200 MMSCFD based on a model
developed by Mahmood Moshfegian and David
Hairston with a total cost by US$ 4.455 billions [20];
10). The owners’ cost which refers to the cost of project
management, operations during the construction period,
and others by US$ 1.688 billions [15]. The total
estimated development cost of the project based on the
two analysis scenarios is shown in Table 2.
Economic feasibility simulation. Based on the project
investments cost presented in Table 2, a simulation of
economic feasibility based PSC scheme was carried out
with an IRR target of at least 12% and positive NPV.
The targeted minimum gas-selling price is US$
8/MMBTU for wellhead and US$ 11/MMBTU for LNG
and gas pipelines. The scheme for the Indonesian PSC
calculation currently applicable is shown in Figure 3.
Due to the high development cost resulted from the CO2
treatments, whilst the project development should be
feasible, incentives should be given in the forms of
contract period, profit-sharing scheme, first trench
Makara J. Technol.

Table 2. Total Estimated Development Cost Based on
Economic Analysis Scenarios

Development Cost
Capital Cost (US$)
Non-Capital Cost
Total Investment Cost

Scenario 1
22,473,622
4,703,428
27,141,050

Scenario 2
18,312,087
4,373,385
22,685,473

Figure 3. The Diagram of Indonesia’sPSC[21]

Table 3. Summary of Assumption Used in PSC Regime

Parameter (Unit)
Government Share
(%)
Contractor Share
(after tax) (%)
FTP (%)
Tax (%)
Contract Period (yr)
Depreciation Method
Discount Rate (%)
LNG Price
(US$/MMBTU)
Inlet Gas Price
(US$/MMBTU)
Outlet Gas Price
(US$/MMBTU)

Scenario 1
70

Scenario 2
70

30

30

20
40
30
Declining
Balance
10
11,00

20
40
30
Declining
Balance
10
11,00

-

8,00

11,00

-
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positive NPV value, other incentives were given in the
forms of higher profit-sharing, FTP reduction and tax
holiday. In this case, the feasibility was calculated based
on the profit sharing of higher than 30%, FTP of smaller
than 20% and tax holiday of more than 5 years.
The feasibility of Natuna-Cirebon gas pipeline using
downstream contract scheme was analyzed by the
calculation of toll fee in accordance with the model set
forth in the Regulation of the Regulatory Agency for
Downstream Oil and Gas (BPH Migas) No. 8/2013 [22].
The appropriate IRR for the construction of new
pipeline, in accordance with the value of WACC
(Weighted Average Cost of Capital) plus IRR
incentives, should reach 12.45%.

3. Result and Discussion
Projected Gas Demand. Based on Figure 4, it can be
seen that gas demand continues to increase along with
the increase in GDP, particularly in the industrial and
electricity sectors, i.e. 6 and 4-fold increases within 30
years respectively. Overall, gas demand increases 4-fold
from 2010 to 2040. Therefore, the gas production or
supply should be increased.
The Role of East Natuna in Filling Supply-Demand
Gap. Based on the projected gas supply-demand until
2040, a description of gas deficits, which will keep on
growing since 2020 (see Figure 5), was obtained. The
increase of domestic gas demand will lead to gas
deficits from initially about 700 MMSCFD in 2020 to
about 5000 MSCFD in 2040.
The total projected gas demand and supply until 2040,
which compare the roles of the East Natuna before and
after production, is shown in Figure 5. Based on the
figure, it can be seen that the gap in the projected gas
supply-demand decreases by approximately 20% due to
the supply of the East Natuna field. Therefore, it is very
relevant to develop the field immediately.

Figure 4. Long-term Domestic Gas Demand

Makara J. Technol.

Figure 5. The Role of Natuna in Filling Supply-Demand Gap

Feasibility of Field Development. Scenario 1. The
calculation of the economic feasibility for Scenario 1
under base case conditions resulted in NPV value of
US$ -2.49 billion and IRR of 8.97%. These imply that
the East Natuna field is not worth developing. To be
feasible with IRR ≥ 12%, then incentives of a profit
sharing ranging from 30% to 55%, a change of FTP to
10%, and 10-year tax holiday was offered. Table 4
presents changes in the economic feasibility parameters
due to changes in the fiscal-incentive variables.
The simulation result showed that for Scenario 1 (see
Table 4), on the gas-selling price of US$ 11/MMBTU for
LNG and US$ 11/MMBTU for gas pipeline, the East
Natuna field is worth developing if contractors are given
incentives of profit sharing of 45%, FTP of 10% and 10year tax holiday.
Figure 6 shows the structure of fiscal policy and its impact
on the project IRR based on Scenario 1. It can be seen that
the profit-sharing incentive variable dominantly influences
changes in project feasibility, followed by the variables of
tax and FTP.
The provision of the tax holiday incentive in Scenario 1
makes the government’s revenue low enough for the first
10 years, ranging between US$ 80 million to US$ 121
million, and it increases significantly on the eleventh year
to US$ 3 billion. The total gross revenue of the project
reaches US$ 321.41 billion, with the government’s
revenue of US$ 110.90 billions and contractors’ revenue
of US$ 99.86 billions.
Scenario 2. Simulation results for the economic feasibility
of Scenario 2 under the base case conditions generated the
NPV value of US$ -3.54 billion and an IRR of 7.81%.
These also imply that the project is not worth developing
without offering any incentives. To be feasible, fiscal
incentives as simulated in Table 5 should be offered.
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Table 4. Impact of Fiscal Incentives on NPV and IRR in Scenario 1
LNG Price
Outlet Pipeline Price
Fiscal Scenario
Profit Sharing (After Tax)
Government
Contractor
70%
30%
65%
35%
60%
40%
55%
45%
50%
50%
45%
55%

Profit Sharing Change
NPV @10% IRR (%)
(US$ '000)
-2,049,951
-399,131
1,251,689
2,902,502
4,553,329
6,204,149

8.97
9.81
10.57
11.28
11.93
12.55

US$ 11/MMBTU
US$ 11/MMBTU
FTP @ 10%
NPV @10% IRR (%)
(US$ '000)
-1,664,828
-41,517
1,581,794
3,205,106
4,828,417
6,451,728

9.14
9.98
10.74
11.44
12.09
12.69

Tax Holiday 10 Years
NPV @10%
IRR (%)
(US$ '000)
-581,001
1,222,949
3,026,898
5,429,868
6,634,796
8,438,745

9.69
10.61
11.45
12.49
12.94
13.62

Table 5. Impact of Fiscal Incentives on NPV and IRR in Scenario 2
LNG Price
Inlet Pipeline Price
Fiscal Scenario
Profit Sharing (After Tax)
Government
Contractor
70%
30%
65%
35%
60%
40%
55%
45%
50%
50%
45%
55%

Profit Sharing Change
NPV @10% IRR (%)
(US$ '000)
-3,545,499
-2,178,527
-811,555
555,418
1,922,390
3,289,362

7.81
8.72
9.54
10.30
11.00
11.65

US$ 11/MMBTU
US$ 8/MMBTU
FTP @ 10%
NPV @10% IRR (%)
(US$ '000)
-3,220,135
-1,876,403
-532,671
811,061
2,154,792
3,498,524

7.96
8.87
9.69
10.45
11.14
11.79

Tax Holiday 10 Years
NPV @10%
IRR (%)
(US$ '000)
-1,957,216
-402,998
1,151,221
2,705,439
4,259,657
5,813,876

8.74
9.75
10.68
11.53
12.32
13.06

Figure 7 presents the changes in IRR due to changes in
fiscal incentives for Scenario 2. The profit-sharing
variable more dominantly influences changes in the
project feasibility than taxes and FTP, so as to serve as a
determining factor.
The provision of the tax holiday in Scenario 2 also
makes the government’s revenue low enough for the
first 10 years, ranges between US$ 60 million to US$
100 million, and increases significantly in the eleventh
year to US$ 2.5 billion.

Figure 6. Changes in IRR Towards Fiscal Incentive Policy
for Scenario 1

Based on the simulation, it was suggested that at the
selling price of US$ 11/MMBTU for LNG and US$
8/MMBTU for pipeline gas, the East Natuna field is
worth developing if contractors are given profit-sharing
incentives after tax of 50%, FTP reduced to 10% and
10-year tax holiday.

Makara J. Technol.

The total gross revenue of the project reaches US$
259.93 billion, with the government’s revenue of US$
81.23 billion and contractors’ revenue of US$ 81.05
billion. Thus, it can be concluded that the development of
Scenario 1 provides higher state revenue than Scenario 2
by US$ (110.90-81.23) billion = US$ 29.67 billion.
Sensitivity Analysis. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1
was performed to evaluate the impact of changes in
capital costs and gas selling prices on the feasibility of
the project. Figure 8 shows that if the capital costs

August 2015 | Vol. 19 | No. 2
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Figure 10. Changes in IRR Due to Changes in Gas Selling
Price Under +10% Changes of Capital Costs
Figure 7. Changes in IRR Towards the Fiscal Incentive in
Scenario 2

To bring the project back to a feasible condition then
incentives should be increased to the benefit of the
contractor. As shown in Figure 9, if the project costs
increase by 10%, then to be feasible, the profit split
should be changed to 41%:59% and tax holiday should
increase to 15 years. In case the capital costs only
increase by 5%, then the project will be feasible
(IRR=12.13%) if profit split becomes 50%:50% and tax
holiday is 12 years.
Instead of allowing more fiscal incentives for the benefit
of the contractor, the project could also proceed if the gasselling price is increased. Figure 10 shows the sensitivity
of the project feasibility due to changes of gas selling
price, in case the capital costs increase by 10%.
Figure 8. Changes of IRR Due to Changes Capital Costs
and in Gas Selling Price

It was found that if the project costs increase by 10%,
there is no need to change fiscal incentives (from 45%
profit split, 10% FTP and 10-year tax holiday as
stipulated in subheading 3.2) if the gas-selling price is
increased
from
US$
11/MMBTU
to
US$
12.65/MMBTU. We can deduce that the government
could keep fiscal incentives, and hence the state
revenues, if the gas selling price increases around 10%.
Toll-fee natuna-cirebon gas pipelines. The calculation of
the toll-fee rate of the Natuna-Cirebon gas pipelines was
performed using the discounted free cash flow with
targeted IRR by 12.45%. The calculation shows that at a
discount rate of 10%, the NPV value is positive at US$
1.29 million and IRR of 12.65%. Therefore, the toll-fee
rate of the Natuna-Cirebon gas pipeline according to the
targeted IRR is no less than US$ 2.3/ MMBTU.

Figure 9. Changes in IRR and Fiscal Incentives Due to
Changes in Capital Costs

4. Conclussions

increase by 10%, then the IRR decreases by 2.81%. The
figure also indicates that if the gas-selling price
decreases by 10%, then IRR also decreases by 1.68%.
Those changes make the project not worth pursuing.

The increased gap of the projected national gas supplydemand until 2040 indicates that it is urgent to develop
East Natuna. The produced gas can be channeled
through pipelines and LNG tankers, and it has been
simulated in accordance with the calculation of the

Makara J. Technol.

August 2015 | Vol. 19 | No. 2

72 Batubara, et al.

project feasibility based on the upstream contract
scheme for the gas pipelines (Scenario 1) and the
downstream scheme without gas pipelines (Scenario 2).
The simulation results show that the gas field is worth
developing if the government provides fiscal incentives
in the forms of a contract extension to 30 years, changes
in the profit-split from 55% to 45%, and FTP to 10% as
well as 10-year tax holiday. It is recommended to select
the upstream contract scheme for gas pipelines
(Scenario 1) because of the greater revenue that the state
will earn, i.e. about US$ 31.38 billion.
State revenue can increase through offering lower
incentives of the profit sharing and taxes as well as
increased FTP, by raising the gas-selling price higher
than US$ 11/MMBTU. Further, in case the project costs
increase by 10%, for the field development to remain
feasible, the government could increase the gas selling
price by around 10% without offering more incentives
to the contractor.
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